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REPRESENTING REFLECTIVE LOGIC IN MODAL LOGIC 
Frank M. Brown 
Abstract: The nonmonotonic logic called Reflective Logic is shown to be representable in a monotonic Modal 
Quantificational Logic whose modal laws are stronger than S5.  Specifically, it is proven that a set of 
sentences of First Order Logic is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Reflective Logic with an initial set 
of axioms and defaults if and only if the meaning of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to a particular 
modal functor of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and of the sentences in those defaults.  This 
result is important because the modal representation allows the use of powerful automatic deduction systems 
for Modal Logic and because unlike the original Reflective Logic, it is easily generalized to the case where 
quantified variables may be shared across the scope of the components of the defaults thus allowing such 
defaults to produce quantified consequences.  Furthermore, this generalization properly treats such 
quantifiers since all the laws of First Order Logic hold and since both the Barcan Formula and its converse 
hold. 
Keywords: Reflective Logic, Modal Logic, Nonmonotonic Logic. 
1. Introduction 
One of the simplest nonmonotonic logics which inherently deals with entailment conditions in addition to 
possibility conditions in its defaults is the so-called Reflective Logic [Brown 1989].  The basic idea of 
Reflective Logic is that there are some assumptions Γ and some non-logical "inference rules" of the form: 
α : β1,...,βm 
χ 
which suggest that χ may be inferred whenever α is inferable and each β1,...,βm is consistent with everything 
that is inferable. Such "inference rules" are not recursive and are circular in that the determination as to 
whether χi is derivable depends on whether βj is consistent which in turn depends on what was derivable 
from this and other defaults.  Thus, tentatively applying such inference rules by checking the consistency of 
β1,...,βm with only the current set of inferences produces a χi result which may later have to be retracted.  
For this reason valid inferences in a nonmonotonic logic such as Reflective Logic are essentially carried out 
not in the original nonmonotonic logic, but rather in some (monotonic) metatheory in which that nonmonotonic 
logic is defined.  [Brown 1989] explicated this intuition2 by defining Reflective Logic in terms of the set 
theoretic proof theory metalanguage of First Order Logic (i.e. FOL) with the following fixed-point expression:  
'κ=(rl 'κ {'Γi} 'αi:'βij/'χi) 
where rl is defined as:  (rl 'κ {'Γi} 'αi:'βij/'χi) =df (fol({'Γi}∪{'χi:('αiε'κ)∧∧j=1,mi('(¬βij)∉'κ)})) 
where 'αi, βij, and 'χi are the closed sentences of FOL  occurring in the ith "inference rule" and {'Γi} is a set of 
closed sentences of FOL and 'Γi is the ith sentence in that set.  A closed sentence is a sentence without any 
free variables.  fol is a function which produces the set of theorems derivable in FOL from the set of sentences 
to which it is applied.  The quotations appended to the front of these Greek letters indicate references in the 
metalanguage to sentences of the FOL object language.  Interpreted doxastically this fixed-point equation 
states: 
 
the set of closed sentences which are believed is equal to: 
  the set of closed sentences derived in FOL from 
    the union of the set of closed sentences: {'Γi}, 
                 and the set of closed sentences of the form 'χi such that for each i,  
                             the closed sentence 'αi is believed and for each j, the closed sentence 'βij is believable. 
                                                          
2 This explication is simpler but less sophisticated in its properties than that of Default Logic [Reiter 1980].  
The fixed-points of both logics obey the laws: 'κ=(fol 'κ), 'κ⊃{'Γi}, and 
((αiε'κ)∧∧j=1,mi('(¬βij)∉'κ))→('χiε'κ).  However, the fixed points of Default Logic are a subset of the 
fixed-points of Reflective Logic, but the converse is in general not true.  Moreover, the fixed-points of 
Reflective Logic are the kernels of the fixed points of Autoepistemic Logic [Moore 1985].  
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The purpose of this paper is to show that all this metatheoretic machinery including the formalized syntax of 
FOL, the proof theory of FOL, the axioms of a strong set theory, and the set theoretic fixed-point equation is 
not needed and that the essence of Reflective Logic is representable as a necessary equivalence in a simple 
(monotonic) Modal Quantificational Logic.  Interpreted as a doxastic logic this necessary equivalence states: 
that which is believed is logically equivalent to 
  for each i , Γi  and for each i,  if αi is believed and for each j, βij is believable then χi 
thereby eliminating all mention of any metatheoretic machinery. 
The remainder of this paper proves that this modal representation is equivalent to Reflective Logic.  Section 
2 describes a formalized syntax for a FOL object language.  Section 3 describes the part of the proof theory of 
FOL needed herein (i.e. theorems FOL1-FOL4).  Section 4 describes the Intensional Semantics of FOL which 
includes laws giving the meaning of FOL sentences: M0-M7, theorems giving the meaning of sets of FOL 
sentences: MS1, MS2, MS3, and laws specifying the relationship of meaning and modality to the proof theory 
of FOL (i.e. the laws R0, A1, A2, and A3 and the theorems: C1, C2, C3, and C4).  The modal version of 
Reflective Logic, called RL, is defined in section 5 and explicated with theorems MR1-MR6 and SS1-SS2.  In 
section 6, this modal version is shown by theorems RL1 and RL2 to be equivalent to the set theoretic fixed-
point equation for Reflective Logic.  Figure 1 outlines the relationship of all these theorems in producing the 
final theorems RL2, FOL4, and MR6.   
MS3
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C1
C3
M0-M7
RL2
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FOL1FOL2
C2FOL3
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MR3 MR4
MR5
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Figure 1: Dependencies among the Theorems 
 
2. Formal Syntax of First Order Logic 
We use a First Order Logic (i.e. FOL) defined as the six tuple: (→, #f, ∀, vars, predicates, functions) where 
→, #f, and ∀ are logical symbols, vars is a set of variable symbols, predicates is a set of predicate symbols 
each of which has an implicit arity specifying the number of associated terms, and functions is a set of 
function symbols each of which has an implicit arity specifying the number of associated terms.  The sets of 
logical symbols, variables, predicate symbols, and function symbols  are pairwise disjoint.  Lower case 
Roman letters possibly  indexed with digits are used as variables.  Greek letters possibly indexed with digits 
are used as syntactic metavariables. γ, γ1,...γn, range over the variables, ξ, ξ1...ξn range over sequences of 
variables of an appropriate arity, π,π1...πn range over the predicate symbols, φ, φ1...φn range over function 
symbols, δ, δ1...δn, σ   range over terms, and α, α1...αn, β, β1...βn,χ, χ1...χn, Γ1,...Γn,ϕ range over 
sentences.  The terms are of the forms γ and (φ δ1...δn), and the sentences are of the forms (α→β), #f, (∀γ 
α), and (π δ1...δn).  A nullary predicate π or function φ is written as a sentence or a term without 
parentheses.  ϕ{π/λξα} represents the replacement of all occurrences of π in ϕ by λξα followed by lambda 
conversion.  The primitive symbols are shown in Figure 2 with their intuitive interpretations. 
 
Symbol Meaning 
α→ β if α then β. 
#f falsity 
∀γ α for all γ, α. 
Figure 2: Primitive Symbols of First Order Logic 
 
The defined symbols are listed in Figure 3 with their definitions and intuitive interpretations. 
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Symbol Definition Meaning  Symbol Definition Meaning 
¬α α → #f not α  α∧β ¬(α → ¬β) α and β 
#t ¬ #f truth  α↔ β (α→ β) ∧ (β→ α) α if and only if β 
α∨β (¬ α)→ β α or β  ∃γ α ¬∀γ ¬α for some γ , α 
Figure 3: Defined Symbols of First Order Logic 
 
The FOL object language expressions are referred in the metalanguage (which also includes a FOL syntax) 
by inserting a quote sign in front of the object language entity thereby making a structural descriptive name of 
that entity.   In addition to referring to object language sentences, the formalized metalanguage also needs to 
refer to sets of sentences of FOL.  Generally, a set of sentences is represented as: {'Γi} which is defined as: 
{'Γi: #t} which in turn is defined as: {s: ∃i(s='Γi)} where i ranges over some range of numbers (which may be 
finite or non-infinite).  With a slight abuse of  notation we also write 'κ, 'Γ  to refer to such sets. 
3. Proof Theory of First Order Logic 
First Order Logic (i.e. FOL) is axiomatized with a recursively enumerable set of theorems as the set of axioms 
is itself recursively enumerable and its inference rules are recursive.  The axioms and inference rules of FOL 
[Mendelson 1964] are those given in Figure 4.  They form a standard set of axioms and inference rules for 
FOL. 
MA1: α → (β→ α)     MR1: from α and (α→ β) infer β 
MA2: (α→ ( β→ ρ)) → ((α→ β)→ (α→ ρ))  MR2: from α infer (∀γ α) 
MA3: ((¬ α)→ (¬ β))→ (((¬ α)→ β)→α) 
MA4: (∀γ α)→ β  where β is the result of substituting an expression (which is free for the free positions 
        of γ  in α) for  all the free occurrences of γ  in α. 
MA5: ((∀γ(α → β)) →  (α→(∀γ β)))  where γ does not occur in α. 
Figure 4: Inferences Rules and Axioms of FOL 
In order to talk about sets of sentences we include in the metatheory set theory symbolism as developed 
along the lines of [Quine 1969].  This set theory includes the symbols ε, ∉, ⊃, =, ∪ as is defined therein. 
The derivation operation (i.e. fol) of any First Order Logic obeys the Inclusion (i.e. FOL1) and Idempotence 
(i.e. FOL2) properties:  
FOL1: (fol 'κ)⊃'κ      Inclusion 
FOL2: (fol 'κ)⊃(fol(fol 'κ))     Idempotence 
From these two properties we prove: 
FOL3:  (rl 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi))=(fol(rl 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi)) 
proof: FOL1 and FOL2 imply that (fol(fol 'κ))=(fol 'κ).  Since rl begins with fol this implies: 'κ=(fol(rl 'κ)) QED. 
 
FOL4: ('κ=(rl 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi))→('κ=(fol 'κ)) 
proof:  From the hypothesis and FOL3: 'κ=(fol(rl 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi)) is derived.  Using the hypothesis to replace 
(rl 'κ 'Γ 'αi:'βij/'χi) by 'κ in this result gives: 'κ=(fol 'κ).  QED. 
4. Intensional Semantics of FOL 
The meaning (i.e. mg) [Brown 1978, Boyer&Moore 1981] or rather disquotation of a sentence of First Order 
Logic (i.e. FOL) is defined to satisfy the laws given in Figure 5 below3.  mg is defined in terms of mgs which 
maps each FOL object language sentence and an association list into a meaning.  Likewise, mgn maps a FOL 
object language term and an association list into a meaning.  An association list is simply a list of pairs 
consisting of an object language variable and the meaning to which it is bound. 
 
                                                          
3 The laws M0-M7 are analogous to Tarski's definition of truth except that finite association lists are used to 
bind variables to values rather than infinite sequences.  M4 is different since mg is interpreted as being 
meaning rather than truth. 
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M0: (mg 'α) =df (mgs '(∀γ1...γn α)'())  where 'γ1...'γn are all the free variables in 'α 
M1: (mgs '(α → β)a) ↔ ((mgs 'α a)→(mgs 'β a)) 
M2: (mgs '#f a) ↔ #f 
M3: (mgs '(∀ γ α)a) ↔ ∀x(mgs 'α(cons(cons 'γ x)a)) 
M4: (mgs '(π δ1...δn)a) ↔ (π(mgn 'δ1 a)...(mgn 'δn a))  for each predicate symbol 'π. 
M5: (mgn '(φ  δ1...δn)a) = (φ(mgn 'δ1 a)...(mgn 'δn a))   for each function symbol 'φ. 
M6: (mgn 'γ a) = (cdr(assoc 'γ a)) 
M7: (assoc v  L) = (if(eq? v(car(car L))) (car L) (assoc v(cdr L))) 
       where: cons, car, cdr, eq?, if are axiomatized as they are axiomatized in Scheme. 
Figure 5: The Meaning of FOL Sentences 
 
For example, the meaning of the sentence "Everything is less than something" is the proposition that 
everything is less than something.  Thus the meaning operator disquotes its argument.  Here is an example 
derivation: 
(mg '(∀x∃y(< x y))) 
Replacing the defined symbols of the object language by primitive symbols of the object language gives: 
(mg '(∀x((∀y((< x y)→#f))→#f))).  By M0 this is equivalent to:  (mgs '(∀x((∀y((< x y)→#f))→#f)) '()) 
By M3 this is equivalent to:  ∀x(mgs '((∀y((< x y)→#f))→#f) (cons(cons 'x  x)'())) 
By M1 this is equivalent to:  ∀x((mgs '(∀y((< x y)→#f)) (cons(cons 'x  x)'())) →(mgs '#f (cons(cons 'x  x)'()))) 
By M2 this is equivalent to:   ∀x((mgs '(∀y((< x y)→#f)) (cons(cons 'x  x)'()))→#f) 
We would now like to apply M3 to: (mgs '(∀y((< x y)→#f)) (cons(cons 'x  x)'()))  
but we cannot since the bound variable x in M3 would capture the variable x which is free in this expression.  
In order to apply M3 we must first rename the bound variable x in M3 to be some other variable which will not 
capture any free variables in this expression.  In this case we rename the bound x in M3 to be y, and then use 
that version of M3 to produce the equivalent expression: 
∀x((∀y(mgs '((< x y)→#f)  (cons(cons 'y y)(cons(cons 'x  x)'())))) →#f) 
By M1 this is equivalent to: 
∀x((∀y((mgs '(< x y) (cons(cons 'y y)(cons(cons 'x x)'()))) →(mgs '#f (cons(cons 'y y)(cons(cons 'x  x)'()))))) 
→#f) 
By M2 this is equivalent to:  ∀x∃y((mgs '(< x y) (cons(cons 'y y)(cons(cons 'x  x)'()))) By M4 this is equivalent 
to: ∀x∃y(<(mgn 'x(cons(cons 'y y)(cons(cons 'x  x)'()))) (mgn 'y (cons(cons 'y y)(cons(cons 'x  x)'())))) 
By M6 twice this is equivalent to: ∀x∃y(< x y) 
 
The meaning of a set of sentences is defined in terms of the meanings of the sentences in the set as: 
 (ms 'κ) =df ∀s((sε'κ)→(mg s)) 
MS1: (ms{'α: Γ}) ↔ ∀ξ(Γ→α)  where ξ is the sequence of all the free variables in 'α and where Γ is any 
sentence of the intensional semantics. 
proof: (ms{'α:Γ})  Unfolding ms and the set pattern abstraction symbol gives: ∀s((sε{s: ∃ξ((s='α)∧Γ)})→(mg 
s)) 
where ξ is a sequence of the free variables in 'a.  This is equivalent to: ∀s((∃ξ((s='α)∧Γ)))→(mg s)) 
which is logically equivalent to: ∀s∀ξ (((s='κ)∧Γ)→(mg s)) which is equivalent to: ∀ξ(Γ→(mg 'α)) 
Unfolding mg using M0-M7 then gives: ∀ξ(Γ→α) QED 
The meaning of the union of two sets of FOL sentences is the conjunction of their meanings (i.e. 
MS1) and the meaning of a set is the meaning of all the sentences in the set (i.e. MS2): 
 
MS2: (ms{'Γi}) ↔ ∀i∀ξiΓi 
proof:  (ms{'Γi})  Unfolding the set notation gives: (ms{'Γi: #t}) 
By MS1 this is equivalent to: ∀i∀ξi(#t→Γi) which is equivalent to: ∀i∀ξiΓi QED. 
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MS3: (ms('κ∪'Γ)) ↔ ((ms 'κ)∧(ms 'Γ)) 
proof: Unfolding ms and union in: (ms('κ∪'Γ)) gives: ∀s((sε{s: (sε'κ)∨(sε'Γ)})→(mg s)) or rather: 
∀s(((sε'κ)∨(sε'Γ))→(mg s)) which is logically equivalent to: (∀α((sε'κ)→(mg s)))∧(∀s((sε'Γ)→(mg s))) 
Folding ms twice then gives:((ms 'κ)∧(ms 'Γ)) QED. 
 
The meaning operation may be used to develop an Intensional Semantics for a FOL object language by 
axiomatizing the modal concept of necessity so that it satisfies the theorem: 
C1:          ('αε(fol 'κ))  ↔  ([] ((ms 'κ)→(mg 'α))) 
for every sentence 'α and every set of sentences 'κ of that FOL object language. The necessity symbol is 
represented by a box: [].  C1 states that a sentence of FOL is a FOL-theorem (i.e. fol) of a set of sentences of 
FOL if and only if the meaning of that set of sentences necessarily implies the meaning of that sentence.   
One modal logic which satisfies C1 for FOL4 is the Z Modal Quantificational Logic described in [Brown 1987; 
Brown 1989] whose theorems are recursively enumerable.  Z has the metatheorem: (<>Γ){π/λξα}→ (<>Γ) 
where Γ is a sentence of FOL and includes all the laws of S5 Modal Logic [Hughes & Cresswell 1968] whose 
modal axioms and inference rules are given in Figure 6.  Therein, κ and Γ represent arbitrary sentences of 
the intentional semantics. 
R0: from α infer ([] κ)   A2:  ([](κ→ Γ)) → (([]κ)→ ([]Γ)) 
A1: ([]κ) → κ    A3: ([]κ) ∨ ([]¬[]κ) 
Figure 6: The Laws of S5 Modal Logic 
These S5 modal laws and the laws of FOL given in Figure 4 constitute an S5 Modal Quantificational Logic 
similar to [Carnap 1946; Carnap 1956], and a FOL version [Parks 1976] of [Bressan 1972] in which the 
Barcan formula: (∀γ([]κ))→([]∀γκ) and its converse hold.  The R0 inference rule implies that anything 
derivable in the metatheory is necessary.  Thus, in any logic with R0, contingent facts would never be 
asserted as additional axioms of the metatheory.  For example, we would not assert ([](κ↔Γ)) as an axiom 
and then try to prove ([](κ→α)).  Instead we would try to prove that ([](κ↔Γ))→([](κ→α)). 
The defined Modal symbols used herein are listed in Figure 7 with their definitions and 
interpretations. 
Symbol Definition Meaning  Symbol Definition Meaning 
<>κ ¬ [] ¬κ α is logically possible  [κ] Γ  [] (κ→Γ) β entails α 
κ≡ Γ [] (κ↔Γ) α is logically equivalent to β  <κ> Γ <> (κ∧Γ) α and β is logically possible 
Figure 7: Defined Symbols of Modal Logic 
For example, folding the definition of entailment, C1 may be rewritten more compactly as: 
C1':          ('αε(fol 'κ)) ↔  ([(ms 'κ)](mg 'α)) 
This compact notation for entailment is used hereafter. 
From the laws of the Intensional Semantics we prove that the meaning of the set of FOL consequences of a 
set of sentences is the meaning of that set of sentences (C2), the FOL consequences of a set of sentences 
contain the FOL consequences of another set if and only if the meaning of the first set entails the meaning of 
the second set (C3), and the sets of FOL consequences of two sets of sentences are equal if and only if the 
meanings of the two sets are logically equivalent (C4): 
C2: (ms(fol 'κ))≡(ms 'κ) 
proof: The proof divides into two cases: 
(1) [(ms 'κ)](ms(fol 'κ)))  Unfolding the second ms gives: [(ms 'κ)]∀s((sε(fol 'κ))→(mg s)) 
By the soundness part of C1 this is equivalent to:  [(ms 'κ)]∀s(([(ms 'κ)](mg s))→(mg s)) 
By the S5 laws this is equivalent to: ∀s(([(ms 'κ)](mg s))→ [(ms 'κ)](mg s))  which is a tautology. 
(2) [(ms(fol 'κ))](ms 'κ)  Unfolding ms twice gives: [∀s((sε(fol 'κ))→(mg s))]∀s((sε'κ)→(mg s)) 
which is: [∀s((sε(fol 'κ))→(mg s))]((sε'κ)→(mg s))  Backchaining on the hypothesis and then dropping it 
gives: (sε'κ)→(sε(fol 'κ)).  Folding ⊃ gives an instance of FOL1. QED. 
                                                          
4An S5 modal logic which satisfies a metatheorem analogous to C1 for Propositional Logic is the system S5c 
given in [Hendry and Pokriefka 1985] which has axiom schemes stating that every conjunction of distinct 
propositional constants is logically possible.  This extends the trivial possibility axiom that some proposition 
is neither #t nor #f used in [Lewis 1936; Bressan 1972].  
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C3: (fol 'κ)⊇(fol 'Γ) ↔ ([(ms 'κ)](ms 'Γ)) 
proof: Unfolding ⊇ gives: ∀s((sε(fol 'Γ))→(sε(fol 'κ))) 
By C1 twice this is equivalent to: ∀s(([(ms 'Γ)](mg s))→([(ms 'κ)](mg s))) 
By the laws of S5 modal logic this is equivalent to: ([(ms 'κ)]∀s(([(ms 'Γ)](mg s)))→(mg s))) 
By C1 this is equivalent to: [(ms 'κ)]∀s((sε(fol 'Γ))→(mg s)).  Folding ms then gives: [(ms  'κ)](ms(fol 'Γ)) 
By C2 this is equivalent to:  [(ms  'κ)](ms 'Γ). QED. 
 
C4: ((fol 'κ)=(fol 'Γ)) ↔ ((ms 'κ)≡(ms 'Γ)) 
proof:  This is equivalent to (((fol 'κ)⊇(fol 'Γ))∧((fol 'Γ)⊇(fol 'κ))) ↔ ([(ms 'κ)](ms 'Γ))∧([(ms 'Γ)](ms 'κ)) 
which follows by using C3 twice. 
 
5. Reflective Logic Represented in Modal Logic 
The fixed-point equation for Reflective Logic may be expressed as a necessary equivalence in an S5 Modal 
Quantificational Logic as follows: κ≡(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)  where RL is defined as:  (RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi) =df 
Γ∧∀i((([κ]αi)∧(∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij)))→χi)  where Γ, αi, βij, and χi are propositions of FOL.  When the context is 
obvious Γ αi:βij/χi is omitted and just (RL κ) is written.  Given below are some simple properties of RL. The 
first two theorems state that RL entails Γ and any conclusion χi of a default whose entailment condition holds 
in κ and whose possible conditions are possible with κ. 
MR1:  [(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)]Γ 
proof: By R0 it suffices to prove: (RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)→Γ.  Unfolding RL gives: 
Γ∧∀i((([κ]αi)∧(∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij)))→χi)→Γ  which is a tautology. QED. 
 
MR2: (([κ]αi)∧(∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij)))→([(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)]χi) 
proof: Unfolding RL gives: (([κ]αi)∧(∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij)))→([Γ∧∀i((([κ]αi)∧(∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij)))→χi)]χi) 
Using the hypotheses on the ith instance gives: 
(([κ]αi)∧(∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij)))→ ([Γ∧∀i((([κ]αi)∧(∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij)))→χi)∧χi]χi) which is a tautology. QED. 
 
The concept (i.e. ss) of the combined meaning of all the sentences of the FOL object language whose 
meanings are entailed by a proposition is defined as follows: 
(ss κ) =df ∀s(([κ](mg s))→(mg s)) 
SS1 shows that a proposition entails the combined meaning of the FOL object language sentences that it 
entails.  SS2 shows that if a proposition is necessarily equivalent to the combined meaning of the FOL object 
language sentences that it entails, then there exists a set of FOL object language sentences whose meaning 
is necessarily equivalent to that proposition: 
SS1: [κ](ss κ) 
proof: By R0 it suffices to prove: κ→(ss κ).  Unfolding ss gives: κ→∀s(([κ](mg s))→(mg s)) 
which is equivalent to:∀s(([κ](mg s))→(κ→(mg s)))  which is an instance of A1. QED. 
 
SS2: (κ≡(ss κ))→ ∃s(κ≡(ms s)) 
proof: Letting s be {s: ([κ](mg s)) gives (κ≡(ss κ))→ (κ≡(ms{s: ([κ](mg s)))).  Unfolding ms and lambda 
conversion gives: (κ≡(ss κ))↔ (κ≡∀s(([κ](mg s))→(mg s))).  Folding ss gives a tautology. QED. 
 
The theorems MR3 and MR4 are analogous to MR1 and MR2 except that RL is replaced by the combined 
meanings of the sentences entailed by RL. 
MR3: [ss(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi)]∀iΓi 
proof: By R0 it suffices to prove:  (ss(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi))→∀iΓI which is equivalent to:  
(ss(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi))→Γi.  Unfolding ss gives:  (∀s(([(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi)](mg s))→(mg s)))→Γi 
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which by the meaning laws M0-M8 is equivalent to:  (∀s(([(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi)](mg s))→(mg s)))→(mg 'Γi) 
Backchaining on (mg  'Γi) with s in the hypothesis being 'Γi in the conclusion shows that it suffices to prove:  
([(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi)](mg 'Γi)) which by the meaning laws: M0-M7 is equivalent to: ([(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi)]Γi) 
which by the laws of S5 Modal Logic is equivalent to: ([(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi)]∀iΓi) 
which is an instance of theorem MR1. QED. 
 
MR4: (([κ]αi)∧(∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij)))→ ([ss(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)]χi) 
proof:  Unfolding the last ss gives: (([κ]αi)∧∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij))→ ([∀s(([(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)](mg s))→(mg s))]χi) 
Instantiating s in the hypothesis to 'χi and then dropping the hypothesis gives: 
(([κ]αi)∧∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij))→ ([([(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)](mg 'χi))→(mg 'χi)]χi) 
Using the meaning laws M0-M7 gives: (([κ]αi)∧∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij))→ ([([(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)]χi)→χi]χi) 
Backchaining on χi shows that it suffices to prove:(([κ]αi)∧∧j=1,mi(<κ>βij))→([(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi)]χi) 
which is an instance of theorem MR2. QED. 
 
Finally MR5 and MR6 show that talking about the meanings of sets of FOL sentences in the modal 
representation of Reflective Logic is equivalent to talking about propositions in general. 
MR5: (ss(RL κ(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi))≡(RL κ(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi) proof: In view of SS1, it suffices to prove 
:( [(ss(RL κ(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi))](RL κ(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi)).  Unfolding the second occurrence of RL gives:[(ss(RL 
κ(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi))](∀iΓi∧∀i((([κ]αi)∧∧j=1,mi<κ>βij)→χi) which holds by theorems MR3 and MR4. QED. 
 
MR6: (κ≡(RL κ(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi))→∃s(κ≡(ms s)) 
proof: From the hypothesis and MR5 κ≡(ss(RL κ ∀iΓi αi:βij/χi)) is derived.  Using the hypothesis to replace 
(RL κ(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi) by κ in this result gives:  κ≡(ss(RL κ(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi)),  By SS2 this implies the 
conclusion. QED. 
 
6. Conclusion: The Relationship between Reflective Logic and the Modal Logic 
The relationship between the proof theoretic definition of Reflective Logic [Brown 1989] and the modal 
representation is developed and proven in two steps.  First theorem RL1 shows that the meaning of the set rl 
is the proposition RL and then theorem RL2 shows that a set of FOL sentences which contains its FOL 
theorems is a fixed-point of the fixed-point equation of Reflective Logic with an initial set of axioms and 
defaults if and only if the meaning (or rather disquotation) of that set of sentences is logically equivalent to RL 
of the meanings of that initial set of sentences and those defaults. 
 
RL1: (ms(rl(fol 'κ){'Γi}'αi:'βij/'χi))≡(RL(ms 'κ)(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi) 
proof: (ms(rl(fol 'κ){'Γi}'αi:'βij/'χi)) 
Unfolding the definition of rl gives:  ms(fol({'Γi}∪{'χi:('αiε(fol 'κ))∧∧j=1,mi('(¬βij)∉(fol 'κ))})) 
By C2 this is equivalent to: ms({'Γi}∪{'χi:('αiε(fol 'κ))∧∧j=1,mi('(¬βij)∉(fol 'κ))}) 
Using C1 twice gives:  ms({'Γi}∪{'χi: (([(ms 'κ)](mg 'αi)) ∧∧j=1,mi¬([(ms 'κ)](mg '(¬βij))))}) 
Using MS3 gives:  (ms {'Γi})∧(ms{'χi: (([(ms 'κ)](mg 'αi)) ∧∧j=1,mi¬([(ms 'κ)](mg '(¬βij))))}) 
Using MS2 gives:  (∀iΓi)∧(ms{'χi: (([(ms 'κ)](mg 'αi)) ∧∧j=1,mi¬([(ms 'κ)](mg '(¬βij))))}) 
Using MS1 gives:  (∀iΓi)∧∀i((([(ms 'κ)](mg 'αi))∧∧j=1,mi¬([(ms 'κ)](mg '(¬βij))))→(mg 'χi)) 
Using M0-M7 gives: (∀iΓi)∧∀i((([(ms 'κ)]αi)∧∧j=1,mi¬([(ms 'κ)]¬βij))→ χi) 
Folding the definition of RL then gives:  (RL(ms 'κ)(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi) QED. 
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RL2: ((fol 'κ)=(rl(fol 'κ){'Γi} 'αi:'βij/'χi))↔((ms 'κ)≡(RL(ms 'κ)(∀iΓi)αi:βij/χi)) 
proof: (fol 'κ)=(rl(fol 'κ){'Γi} 'αi:'βij/'χi) By FOL3 this is equivalent to: (fol 'κ)=(fol(rl(fol 'κ){'Γi} 'αi:'βij/'χi)) 
By C4 this is equivalent to: ((ms 'κ)≡(ms(rl(fol 'κ){'Γi} 'αi:'βij/'χi))) 
By RL1 this is equivalent to: (ms 'κ)≡(RL(ms 'κ)(∀iΓi) αi:βij/χi))  QED. 
 
Theorem RL2 shows that the set of theorems: (fol 'κ) of a set 'κ is a fixed-point of a fixed-point equation of 
Reflective Logic if and only if the meaning (ms 'κ) of 'κ is a solution to the necessary equivalence.  
Furthermore, by FOL4 there are no other fixed-points (such as a set not containing all its theorems)  and by 
MR6 there are no other solutions (such as a proposition not representable as a sentence in the FOL object 
language).  Therefore, the Modal representation of Reflective Logic (i.e. RL), faithfully represents the set 
theoretic description of Reflective Logic (i.e. rl).Finally, we note that ∀iΓi and (ms 'κ) may be generalized to 
be arbitrary propositions Γ and κ giving the more general modal representation:  κ≡(RL κ Γ αi:βij/χi). 
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